Abstract-In this letter, we model a complete-information zerosum game between a centralized detection network with a multiple access channel between the sensors and the fusion center (FC), and a jammer with multiple transmitting antennas. We choose error probability at the FC as the performance metric, and investigate pure strategy equilibria for this game, and show that the jammer has no impact on the FC's error probability by employing pure strategies at the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we also show that the jammer has an impact on the expected utility if it employs mixed strategies.
On Strategic Multi-Antenna Jamming in Centralized Detection Networks I. INTRODUCTION AND SYSTEM MODEL J AMMING attacks in detection networks may have a significant impact on today's world due to the broad range of applications of these networks [1] . Therefore, several attempts have been made in the literature to analyze and mitigate different types of jamming threats in detection networks for different topological configurations. For more details, the readers may refer to [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] and citations therein. Among various approaches proposed to mitigate jamming attacks, game theory is widely adopted while designing several wireless systems/networks in the presence of a strategic jammer [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . In our past work, we have addressed strategic jamming in the context of parallel-topology detection networks with multiple access channels (MACs) for the first time in [21] . In [21] , we found equilibrium strategies numerically for a zero-sum game between a centralized detection network and a simple Gaussian jammer with an average power constraint and a single antenna per channel. In this letter, we extend our work in [21] by investigating pure strategy equilibria in a closed form, for a complete-information zero-sum game between a centralized detection network and a powerful Manuscript received August 16, 2016 ; revised December 18, 2016 ; accepted December 20, 2013 . Date of publication January 9, 2017; date of current version January 20, 2017. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. V. Matta.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/LSP.2017.2649378 jammer equipped with multiple antennas and instantaneous power constraints. Consider a centralized detection network where N sensing agents share raw observations with the fusion center (FC), which makes a global decision regarding the presence/absence of the phenomenon-of-interest (PoI) in the presence of a disruptive jammer, as shown in Fig. 1 . In this letter, we assume that the sensing agents sense a specific electromagnetic radiation emitted/reflected by the PoI, which is found in several practical applications such as cognitive-radio and distributed-radar networks. Let H 1 denote the hypothesis when PoI is present, and H 0 otherwise, with prior probabilities π 1 and π 0 , respectively. We model the PoI's signal as θ = 1 under H 1 , and θ = 0 otherwise. In this letter, we refer to the channel between the PoI and any given sensor as a sensing channel, and the channel between the sensors and the FC as a communication channel. We assume a MAC at the communication channel, where all the sensors' messages are superimposed within the shared medium into one received signal at the FC. Such channels have been proposed in detection networks [22] [23] [24] [25] . In practice, MAC channels are employed in modeling severely constrained control channels in CR networks [26] and stealth/LPI radars [27] .
The disruptive jammer interferes with both the sensing and the communication channels by introducing the jamming symbols w s and w fc , respectively. For the sake of notational convenience, we stack these jamming symbols together into a supersymbol w = {w s , w fc }. We assume that the jammer has a total power budget P , and denote the set of all possible jammer's strategies as W {w ∈ R L +M | ||w|| 2 2 ≤ P }. If α i and β il denote the known channel-gains at the ith sensing channel due to the PoI signal and the lth antenna at the jammer, respectively, the ith sensor acquires an observation
where n i is a zero-mean AWGN noise with variance σ 
Since r fc is a superposition of the PoI's signal with several Gaussian random variables, r fc |H 0 ∼ N (b T w, σ 2 ) and
is the variance of the noise signal z. We assume that the FC employs a decision rule
where λ ∈ Λ 4 is a real-valued threshold designed to minimize the FC's error probability
while the jammer simultaneously attempts to maximize P E by employing an appropriate jamming signal w.
II. EVALUATION OF PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
We model the interaction between the FC and the jammer formally as a zero-sum game as stated below.
Problem 1: Find the Nash equilibria {λ * , w * } ∈ Λ × W that satisfy the following inequality:
First, we investigate some important properties of P E that guarantee the existence of pure-strategy equilibria. 1 Assuming that the jammer emulates PoI's signal, when the observed signal is passed through a matched filter and sampler, we obtain (1). Note that complete knowledge of the PoI signal at the jammer represents the worst case from system security point of view.
2 Such a channel is observed when both the sensors and the jammer employ identical continuous-modulations to transmit their respective signals. 3 Since this is a likelihood ratio test, all the other rules are dominated. Therefore, their removal does not result any loss in network performance. 4 Although λ can be any real number, we assume that Λ [−R, R], where R is sufficiently large. For more details, the reader may refer to [28, Th. 5, p. 168], which guarantees the existence of a mixed equilibrium.
Lemma 1: For a given b, w, and σ, P E is a quasi-convex function of λ.
Proof: For a fixed b, w and σ, we differentiate P E with respect to λ and obtain
where
Since this structure has similar properties as that in [29, Lemma 1], we omit the remaining proof for brevity.
Any channel model with nonnegative channel gains ensures that every element in vector b is nonnegative. Since many practical channel models such as path-loss model and Rayleigh fading model have nonnegative channel gains, we assume that b is a nonnegative vector in the rest of this section.
Lemma 2: For a given λ, b, and σ, P E is jointly quasiconcave in w, if every entry in b is nonnegative.
Proof: Given any two points w 1 , w 2 ∈ W, P E is jointly quasi-concave [30] if and only if
(7) In our framework, the necessary condition P E (w 1 ) ≤ P E (w 2 ) reduces to
Here, y 1 = b T w 1 and y 2 = b T w 2 are the integral limits and
Given that the values of b, λ, and σ are fixed, we differentiate P E with respect to w and obtain
Substituting (8) and (11) in (7), we need to show that
in order to prove the lemma. Note that f 3 (y) ≥ 0. Since f 4 (y) is a monotonically decreasing function of y, we have g(y) ≥ 0 whenever y ≤ y 0 , and g(y) < 0 whenever y > y 0 , where y 0 is the unique zero-crossing point at which f 4 (y 0 ) = 
Given that P E is quasi-concave-convex in nature, a pure strategy solution exists due to the classic Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan existence theorem [28] , [31] . Therefore, we investigate the network's best response in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The optimal threshold λ * = arg min λ P E (λ, w) for a fixed jammer's strategy w is given by
where c = 1 2a
is independent of w. Proof: We first consider the inner optimization in the maxmin problem where we minimize P E with respect to λ for a fixed jammer's strategy w. The optimal λ = λ * satisfies
stituting (6b) and rearranging terms, we have
where c = 1 2a a 2 + 2σ 2 log π 0 π 1 is independent of w.
Given a fixed jammer's strategy w, if the FC employs the optimal threshold λ * , from (15), the error probability at the FC is given by
Note that P E (λ * , w) is independent of the jammer's strategy w, as stated in the proposition statement.
Note that the best response strategy employed by the network, as shown in (15), is unique for a fixed jammer's strategy w. Furthermore, the jammer's signal introduces a linear shift to the point λ = c, which is optimal in the absence of the jammer. In contrast, when we investigate the optimal jammer's strategy w * by considering the min-max framework, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The optimal jammer's strategy w * = arg max w P E (λ, w) for a fixed threshold λ satisfies
where c = 1
. Such a pure-strategy solution exists only when
Proof: An approach similar to the proof of Proposition 1 can be followed for finding (17) . Therefore, we focus our attention on finding the existence condition, given in (18) .
In order for a pure-strategy solution to exist, w * should lie within the set of strategies that satisfy the jammer's total power budget. In other words, we need (w * ) T w * ≤ P . Therefore, the affine function given in (17) should be within the squareddistance of P units from the origin w = 0. In other words, we have
Note that this condition can also be equivalently stated as given in (18) . Note that the jammer's best response strategy is not unique, as shown in (17) . Indeed, there are infinite possibilities since the jammer can adopt any strategy on a line segment without any regret. Combining the results from Propositions 1 and 2, we have the following main result of this section.
Theorem 1:
is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. At the above equilibrium point, the error probability at the FC is given by We first consider the case where λ *
Comparing this threshold to the optimal threshold from (15), we have λ *
On simplification, we find that w *
b is the optimal jammer's strategy. Thus,
b form a pure-strategy equilibrium. Similarly, it is easy to show that
b is another pure-strategy equilibrium.
Given these two pure-strategy equilibria, we find a parametric representation of all possible pure-strategy Nash equilibria, as given below. Let
where is the vector parameter that ranges from −b and b. Note that the two solutions w * 1 and w * 2 both correspond to the parameter values 1 = −b and = b, respectively. Furthermore, such a linear parameterization is valid because of the fact that w * always lies on the line b T w * = λ − c, as given in (17) . Substituting (22) in (15), we have
Since the equilibrium point satisfies the necessary conditions presented in Propositions 1 and 2, the error probability at the FC is given by (16) .
III. DISCUSSION
Since the network and the jammer are noncooperative, we investigate the convergence of players' strategies in a repeated game from any arbitrary strategy profile. We denote the initial pure strategy profile as (λ 0 , w 0 ), where the total power of the initial jammer's strategy w 0 is within the jammer's power budget P . We assume that all the players' strategies are perfectly observable, i.e., the network makes noiseless observations regarding the jammer's strategy and vice versa.
Lemma 3: Given any initial strategy profile (λ 0 , w 0 ), the players always converge to an equilibria presented in Theorem 1 in a perfectly observable repeated-game, irrespective of the order of their play.
Proof: We prove this lemma in two cases. In the first case, we assume that the network takes the lead, followed by the jammer and so on. In the latter case, we assume the opposite order of play.
CASE-1 [N-J-N-J-· · · ]:
In this case, we assume that the network takes the lead. Therefore, given the initial strategy profile (λ 0 , w 0 ), the network chooses its best response from Proposition 1, which is
Given that ||w 0 || 2 2 ≤ P , without any loss of generality, we can represent w 0 in the same form as shown in Theorem 1. As a result, λ 1 also has the form presented in Theorem 1. Thus, the repeated game converges to an equilibrium point (λ 1 , w 0 ) within one iteration.
CASE-2 [J-N-J-N-· · · ]:
In this case, we assume that the jammer takes the lead. Therefore, given the initial strategy profile 
Otherwise, the jammer employs a strategy w 1b = ±b where the sign of w 1b matches to sign(λ 0 − c). In such a case, the network adopts a best response strategy
In summary, if λ 0 lies between c − √ P · b T b and c + √ P · b T b, the repeated game converges to an equilibrium point (λ 0 , w 1a ) in one iteration. Else, the repeated game converges to an equilibrium point (λ 1 , w 1b ) .
Since both the network and the jammer converge rationally to an equilibrium presented in Theorem 1, there is no incentive for the jammer to employ a pure strategy. This is because the error probability at the FC under such equilibrium solutions is totally independent of the jammer's strategy. In fact, the error probability at the FC in the presence of a jammer is identical to that in the absence of a jammer (i.e., w = 0).
Given that pure strategies are not beneficial to the jammer, we now investigate if there is any incentive to employ a mixed strategy at the jammer. For the sake of illustration, we consider an example similar to the model in [21] , where the jammer employs a signal w ∼ N (0, W ) and admits an average power constraint 5 T r(W ) ≤ P . In the following lemma, we demonstrate that a simple Gaussian jammer with an average power constraint has a greater impact than that of a pure-strategy equilibrium stated in Theorem 1.
Lemma 4: When the network employs its best response (mixed) strategy to the jammer's mixed strategy, the expected utility (average error probability) due to a Gaussian jammer with an average power constraint is always greater than the error probability under pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proof: Let us define a functional (27) where σ
Given a fixed threshold λ at the FC, the error probability at the FC turns out to beP E (λ) = Γ(λ). Note thatP E (λ) is a quasi-convex 6 function of λ. In other words, if the network employs a mixed strategy, the optimal (best response) distribution is given by p(λ) = δ(λ * ), where λ
π 1 is the optimal threshold that minimizesP E (λ), and δ(x) is a Dirac delta function centered at x. Thus, the expected utility (minimumP E (λ)) due to a Gaussian jammer is
Note that U (W ) is a quasi-convex 7 function of W , with its minimum at W being an all-zero matrix. In other words,
where P E (λ * , w * ) is given in (21) . Consequently, the jammer has every incentive to use a mixed strategy rather than employing a deterministic (pure) strategy.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have modeled the interaction between a centralized detection network and a jammer as a zero-sum game, and found a family of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a closed form. We have also shown that both the players converge to one of the equilibrium points proposed, in a perfectly observable repeated game irrespective of the order of their play. Given that purestrategy jamming attacks have no impact on network performance, we demonstrated that even a simple Gaussian jammer with average power constraints achieves a greater expected utility (average error probability due to mixed strategies) than in the case of pure-strategy equilibria. In the future, we will investigate mixed-strategy equilibria in our proposed framework under strict power constraints. Furthermore, we will consider practical incomplete-information games where both the network and the jammer have partial knowledge about the channel gains. We will also study the effects of receiver diversity at the FC, on the network performance in the presence of a jammer.
